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Agreement has been linked to both epistemic and interpersonal benefits. As such, people like to 
be in agreement with others and strive to stay in agreement. Yet, little is known about whether 
and how the way in which agreement is reached affects epistemic outcomes. In a lab experiment 
with a 3 x 2 design, undergraduate participants stated their opinion about a target person to a 
partner who ostensibly (a) either agreed before and after the communication (fortuitous 
agreement), shifted from disagreement to agreement (persuaded agreement), or consistently 
disagreed (no agreement); and (b) either praised their argument quality (substance evaluation) or 
presentational style (style evaluation). I hypothesized that the fortuitous and persuaded  
agreement conditions would yield a greater experience of shared reality (H1) and thus, greater 
epistemic outcomes than the no agreement condition (H2A), and that the relationship between 
agreement and epistemic outcomes would be mediated by the experience of shared reality (H2B). 
I also hypothesized that a substance evaluation would lead to greater shared reality and epistemic 
outcomes than a style evaluation, but only in the persuaded agreement condition (H3). Results 
supported H1 and H2A, partially supported H2B, but did not support H3. The fortuitous and 
persuaded agreement conditions yielded greater shared reality, higher belief certainty, and  
greater epistemic trust than the no agreement condition. Agreement type’s effect on epistemic 
trust was  mediated by the  experience  of shared reality  but  shared  reality  did  not mediate the 
v  
relationship between agreement type and belief certainty. A substance (vs. style) evaluation did 
not lead to greater shared reality or epistemic benefits. These findings fill an important gap in the 
literature and highlight the utility of considering both how agreement is reached and the resulting 
experience of shared reality when examining epistemic outcomes of agreement. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
People like when others agree with them. Individuals are motivated to share their understanding 
of the world, especially their social world, and their inner states—their beliefs, feelings, and 
attitudes—with others (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009). They have a desire to maintain 
harmony in their judgments with others and to reduce attitude discrepancies to remain in 
agreement with others (Hovland & Rosenberg, 1960; Matz & Wood, 2005). Festinger (1954) 
even suggested that the motivation to seek evaluation of one’s opinions and abilities from others 
is a contributing factor to humans’ gregariousness. In accordance with this idea, past research 
has shown both interpersonal (Byrne, 1962; Byrne, Nelson, & Reeves, 1966; Finkel & Eastwick, 
2015) and epistemic consequences of agreement (Byrne, 1971; Echterhoff, Higgins, et al., 2009; 
Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Sigall, 1970). For example, agreement leads to increased attraction 
(Byrne, 1962) and a stronger belief that one’s idea is valid (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). 
Although it is clear that agreement is important and impactful, it is unclear whether the 
way in which agreement is reached matters. Arriving at agreement in different ways may have 
different outcomes for both the relational and epistemic outcomes that emerge. Although the 
primary focus of this project is on epistemic outcomes, it is worthwhile to review the 
interpersonal consequences of agreement because, as it will become apparent, they derive from 
the epistemic impact elicited by agreement. 
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Byrne (1962) suggested that attitude similarity is a powerful variable in determining 
affective responses and is one of the major sources of reward in interpersonal relationships. In 
support of this idea, research has shown that similarity, including attitude similarity, predicts 
attraction (Byrne, 1962; Byrne, 1971; Finkel & Eastwick, 2015; Miller, 2001) and that sharing 
inner states with a partner produces liking above and beyond sharing characteristics with him or 
her (Echterhoff, Higgins, et al., 2009; Miller, 2001). 
These interpersonal consequences of attitude similarity are thought to be based on a 
system of reward and punishment (Byrne, 1962; Byrne, 1971; Finkel & Eastwick, 2015; Reid, 
Davis, & Green, 2013). Good feelings arise from agreement with others, whereas negative 
feelings arise from disagreement. According to the reinforcement approach (Reid et al., 2013), an 
individual associates the good feelings that arise from others agreeing with one’s own views with 
those specific others. For example, if Jenny learns that Josh agrees with her, she feels positively 
about this agreement, and directs these positive feelings towards Josh. If Jenny learns that Josh 
disagrees with her, she feels negatively about the disagreement, and directs these negative 
feelings toward Josh. 
The good feelings that arise from agreement are due to agreement’s epistemic impact. 
Attitude similarity satisfies our need for consensual validation—our need to feel that we can 
predict our environment and that we are correct (Byrne, 1962; Byrne, 1971; Finkel & Eastwick, 
2015; Montoya, Horton, & Kircher, 2008; Reid et al., 2013; Sigall, 1970). Attitude similarity 
achieves this because social consensus produces the perception of an objective reality 
(Echterhoff, 2012; Echterhoff, Higgins, et al., 2009; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Matz & Wood, 
2005; Rimé, 2009). That is, if others view the world in a similar  way, individuals experience 
their own views as  correct. As such, agreement is rewarding because it suggests that one    is
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logical and reduces the need for alternative explanations for why something is occurring 
(Gudykunst & Nishida, 1984). 
Research supports the idea that agreement leads people to feel as though their views 
(which are shared by others) are logical and correct. For example, people show an increase in 
certainty about a belief to the extent that they see that belief as shared by others (Hardin & 
Higgins, 1996). People feel that their attitudes are more valid when others agree rather than 
disagree (Newcomb, 1953). Furthermore, when people think about the attitudinal contrast 
between their in-groups and an out-group, they feel more certain in their attitudes (Holtz & 
Miller, 2001). Petty and Krosnick (1995) also suggest that holding similar attitudes with others 
produces the social support that is necessary to augment certainty to a level sufficient for action. 
Attitude dissimilarity, on the other hand, thwarts our need for consensual validation. This 
frustrates our drive to be correct and elicits a negative reaction, which is then directed toward the 
person who disagreed (Byrne, 1962; Byrne, 1971; Byrne et al., 1966; Montoya et al., 2008). 
Consensual invalidation—when others disagree—is threatening because it presents the 
possibility that one is illogical or inaccurate in predicting the world. Disagreement shakes one’s 
confidence (Petty & Krosnick, 1995) and leads to uncertainty about the belief (Hardin &  
Higgins, 1996; Matz & Wood, 2005; McGarty, Turner, Oakes, & Haslam, 1993) and decreases  
in wellbeing and feelings of connectedness (Rimé, 2009). Attitude dissimilarity is experienced as 
uncomfortable, unpleasant, and difficult (Stromer-Galley & Muhlberger, 2009). It can also be 
detrimental for self-esteem and feelings of acceptance, and can result in a sense of dissonance 
(Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Matz & Wood, 2005). 
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1.1 THE PROCESS OF REACHING AGREEMENT (OR NOT) 
 
 
Although much is known about the consequences of agreement and disagreement—or attitude 
similarity and dissimilarity—it is unclear whether the way in which agreement is reached 
between individuals affects these consequences. Agreement can be reached in several different 
ways. For example, one may agree with a partner fortuitously, or may come to agree with a 
partner by persuading the partner to agree with his/her opinion, by being persuaded to adopt the 
partner’s opinion, or by meeting in the middle ground with a partner. Arriving at agreement in 
these ways may have different outcomes, both in terms of the relational (interpersonal) and 
epistemic consequences that emerge due to agreement. Although there may be different ways in 
which individuals reach disagreement as well, I am concerned here with differences that emerge 
based on how agreement is reached. 
Research on attitudinal deviance in groups supports the idea that the way in which 
agreement is reached matters by demonstrating that different ways of reaching agreement 
produce differences in evaluations of the agreer. For example, Levine, Saxe, and Harris (1976) 
found that a target person who consistently agreed with group consensus was more attractive  
than an individual who moved from disagreement to agreement with the group, which is 
consistent with Byrne’s (1971) predictions about the attraction-similarity link. Not only did these 
different types of agreement result in different attractiveness levels, but participants also 
attributed the agreer's final position to different factors (Levine et al., 1976): Participants 
believed the target person's belief in his or her opinion correctness was more important in 
determining the individual’s final position when that person consistently agreed with group 
consensus, but that the desire to be liked and the desire to be similar to the group were more
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important in determining the individual’s final position when the target person disagreed and  
then agreed with consensus (see also Levine & Ranelli, 1978; Levine, Sroka, & Snyder, 1977). 
 
 
 
1.2 SHARED REALITY THEORY 
 
 
Although the above research shows that different ways of arriving at agreement with a group 
produce different levels of attraction and different attributions, it is still unclear whether different 
ways of achieving agreement would lead to different epistemic outcomes. One conceptual 
framework that may help to address this question is shared reality theory. Shared reality, the end 
state of a motivated process, is achieved when people communicate their inner states about a 
specific referent and come to perceive those inner states about that same referent as shared by 
others (Echterhoff, 2012; Echterhoff, Higgins, et al., 2009; Hardin & Conley, 2001; Hardin & 
Higgins, 1996; Stukas, Bratanova, Peters, Kashima, & Beatson, 2010). To the extent that an 
individual’s experiences are shared by others, those experiences are no longer seen as subjective 
and, instead, come to be viewed as reflecting objective reality (Echterhoff, 2012; Echterhoff, 
Higgins, et al., 2009; Hardin & Higgins, 1996). 
Four conditions underlie shared reality (Echterhoff, 2012; Echterhoff, Higgins, et al., 
2009). The first condition requires that a commonality in inner states, not just overt behaviors, 
exists between the individuals (Echterhoff, 2012; Echterhoff, Higgins, et al., 2009; Hardin & 
Higgins, 1996). That is, the individual must hold the same beliefs, opinions, or judgments about 
the target as the other individual(s) and cannot simply mimic the behavior exhibited by others. 
The second condition contends that the shared reality must be experienced as about some 
referent target (Echterhoff, 2012; Echterhoff, Higgins, et al., 2009). That is, the corresponding
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inner states must be in reference to some aspect of the target or world that can be verified by 
others. Third, it is crucial to take into account the process of achieving shared reality, particularly 
the participants' underlying motives, as well as the successful end state of achieving shared  
reality (Echterhoff, 2012; Echterhoff, Higgins, et al., 2009). Solely focusing on whether shared 
reality is achieved or not would overlook the two key types of motives that contribute to this 
process—epistemic and relational (Echterhoff, 2012; Echterhoff, Higgins, et al., 2009; Hardin & 
Conley, 2001; Hardin & Higgins, 1996). 
Epistemic motives involve the desire to establish certainty, to work towards a valid and 
reliable understanding of the world, and to determine what is real (Echterhoff, 2012; Echterhoff, 
Higgins, et al., 2009; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Higgins, 1999). Shared reality serves the 
epistemic function of achieving reliability, validity, generality, and predictability (Hardin & 
Higgins, 1996). 
Relational motives involve the desire for affiliation and connectedness, which can 
produce a sense of security and increased self-esteem (Echterhoff, 2012; Echterhoff, Higgins, et 
al., 2009). Shared reality serves the relational function of creating or maintaining valued social 
relationships, facilitating subsequent understanding (Hardin & Higgins, 1996), and fostering 
interpersonal trust (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Groll, 2005). 
The fourth and final condition requires the successful recognition of a commonality of 
inner states with another or others about the target referent (Echterhoff, 2012; Echterhoff, 
Higgins, et al., 2009; Hardin & Higgins, 1996). There is no shared reality without the individual 
believing that his/her inner state about a target matches that of someone else. In sum, shared 
reality fosters a subjectively valid and reliable sense of the world and a sense of connectedness 
and  belonging  with  others  (Echterhoff,  2012;  Echterhoff,  Higgins,  et  al.,  2009;  Hardin &
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Higgins, 1996). For example, current members' agreement about the characteristics of a 
newcomer to the group should increase their certainty about their impression of the newcomer 
(serving epistemic motives) and strengthen their social bonds (serving relational motives). 
 
 
 
 
1.3 THE CURRENT PROJECT 
 
 
The goal of this research project was to determine how people respond to different ways of 
reaching (or not reaching) agreement using shared reality theory to predict differences in 
epistemic outcomes. To accomplish this goal, I utilized a 3 (agreement type: fortuitous, 
persuaded, or no agreement) X 2 (evaluation type: substance or style) between-participants 
design. Each participant read an ambiguous passage about a target and made a judgment about 
this person, learned the opinion of an ostensible other participant (the partner), provided his/her 
rationale for his/her judgment of the target to the partner through an audio recording, and learned 
the final opinion of the partner. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six cells of the 
design. For example, some participants were assigned to a condition in which the partner 
fortuitously agreed with them about the target and gave a style evaluation for his/her final 
judgment of the target after ostensibly listening to the participant’s audio recording. Epistemic 
outcomes, specifically belief certainty and epistemic trust, were then measured. 
Epistemic trust is the extent to which someone can rely on another person’s view when 
forming his/her representation of a target (Echterhoff et al., 2005; Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz, 
& Groll, 2008). Although epistemic trust has been used as a measure of shared reality and has 
been examined as a mediator (e.g., of the effects of group membership, communication goals,
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and audience status—conditions that were expected to produce different levels of shared 
reality—on recall bias) in prior studies (Echterhoff et al., 2005; Echterhoff et al., 2008; 
Echterhoff, Lang, Kramer, & Higgins, 2009), in the present study, I included a measure of the 
experience of shared reality designed to capture this subjective perception more directly. I also 
included a measure of epistemic trust, but I conceptualized epistemic trust as an outcome that 
should result from creating shared reality with another person. That is, the experience of having 
created a shared reality about a topic with another person should lead one to believe that the  
other holds valid and reliable judgments about other targets as well (i.e., should increase 
epistemic trust). 
My hypotheses are based on the premises that (1) the experience of shared reality is 
created when the participant and the partner end the interaction in agreement (either by 
fortuitously agreeing or by persuading the partner to agree) and (2) the strength of the shared 
reality is based on the extent to which the participant believes that the other person genuinely 
agrees with him/her. This latter prediction builds on a finding obtained by Prislin, Levine, and 
Christensen (2006), which highlighted the importance of the quality of support for one’s  
position. Prislin and colleagues found that people who moved from minority to majority status in 
a group because others shifted to their position subsequently identified more strongly with both 
their faction and the group as a whole when the others ostensibly moved because of genuine 
agreement rather than a more superficial reason. 
In accordance with these premises, I developed three hypotheses. I summarize the 
hypotheses here, before providing a detailed rationale for each in the paragraphs that follow. I 
hypothesized that the fortuitous and persuaded agreement conditions would result in a greater 
experience of shared reality than the no agreement condition (H1). I also predicted that the
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fortuitous and persuaded agreement conditions would result in higher epistemic outcomes (i.e., 
belief certainty and epistemic trust) than the no agreement condition (H2A) and that the 
relationship between agreement type and these epistemic outcomes would be mediated by the 
experience of shared reality (H2B). I was agnostic about the relative impact of the two 
agreement conditions on the experience of shared reality and epistemic outcomes, because a 
plausible case could be made for the superiority of either condition. Due to this, I first compared 
the no agreement condition to the fortuitous and persuaded agreement conditions together and 
then compared the fortuitous and persuaded agreement conditions to each other. Finally, I 
expected that a substance evaluation (in which the individual is praised for his/her argument 
quality)  would result in a greater experience of shared reality and thus, higher belief certainty 
and epistemic trust, than a style evaluation (in which the individual is praised for his/her style of 
presentation), but only in the persuaded agreement condition (H3). 
 
 
 
 
1.4 RATIONALE FOR HYPOTHESES 
 
 
I expected that the fortuitous and persuaded agreement conditions would result in a greater 
experience of shared reality (H1) and higher epistemic outcomes than the no agreement  
condition (H2A) and that the relationship between agreement and epistemic outcomes would be 
mediated by the experience of shared reality (H2B). The former prediction is based on the 
assumption that the participant would believe that his/her inner state matches that of the partner 
in the former two conditions but not in the latter condition, and this matching is a necessary 
requirement for shared reality to be created (Echterhoff, 2012; Echterhoff, Higgins, et al., 2009). 
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The latter prediction is based on the assumptions that epistemic benefits would result in the 
agreement conditions because (a) one’s belief seems more objective when it is shared (Hardin & 
Higgins, 1996); (b) individuals who hold attitudes similar to ours validate our views (Reid et al., 
2013); and (c) epistemic benefits have been verified as products of achieving shared reality 
(Echterhoff, 2012; Echterhoff, Higgins, et al., 2009; Hardin & Conley, 2001; Hardin & Higgins, 
1996). In contrast, I expected the no agreement condition to produce low epistemic benefits 
because disagreement and attitude dissimilarity lead to uncertainty (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; 
Matz & Wood, 2005; McGarty et al., 1993). 
Regarding H1, I expected the agreement condition that yielded the greater experience of 
shared reality to elicit the greater belief certainty and epistemic trust as well. As suggested above, 
plausible hypotheses could be generated as to which agreement condition would elicit stronger 
outcomes. One possibility is that the experience of shared reality in the fortuitous agreement 
condition would surpass that in the persuaded agreement condition because the total amount of 
agreement in the former condition is greater. The participant may feel greater similarity to the 
partner in this condition as well, which could elicit benefits above that of the persuaded 
agreement condition. The participant also may feel that final agreement in the fortuitous 
condition is more impactful than final agreement in the persuaded agreement condition for two 
reasons. First, the participant cannot attribute the partner’s opinion to social influence; the  
partner stated this opinion before knowing what the participant’s opinion was. Because the 
partner fortuitously agreed with the participant, the participant should see his/her agreement as 
completely genuine. In addition, according to the information processing approach to the 
similarity-attraction link, individuals use similarity to make inferences about what positive 
qualities others hold (Reid et al., 2013). Building on this argument, research has shown that a
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positive evaluation from a positive evaluator is especially rewarding (Kelman & Eagly, 1965; 
Sigall, 1970; Sigall & Aronson, 1969). Participants in the present study may have a positive view 
of the partner after fortuitously agreeing and thus view their final agreement as more positive as  
a consequence –that is, a positive message from a positive evaluator may be perceived as closer 
to the participant’s opinion of the target than a positive message from an evaluator that is less 
liked (Kelman & Eagly, 1965). If the participant ascribes positive qualities to the partner because 
of the initial agreement, he/she may see the partner’s final agreement as providing more shared 
reality because the inner state of the partner would feel closer to the participant’s actual inner 
state. 
An alternative possibility is that the persuaded agreement condition may produce a 
stronger experience of shared reality than the fortuitous agreement condition. Specifically, the 
fortuitous agreement condition lacks the reinforcement that the partner agrees for the same 
reasons as the participant. It is possible, for example, that the partner who fortuitously agrees 
about his/her overall opinion of the target has very different reasons for holding that opinion than 
does the participant, which may diminish the experience of shared reality, as well as the resulting 
epistemic benefits. 
Past research on social comparison, attitude alignment research, and gain-loss theory also 
support the idea that the persuaded agreement condition may result in a stronger experience of 
shared reality. Though Festinger (1954) contended that social comparison leads to pressures 
toward uniformity and discussed the tendency to stop comparing to others who are very  
divergent (Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 2000), critics have argued that divergent opinion can 
actually represent correctness and that people seek out novelty and difference. Goethals and 
Darley’s  (1977)  attributional  reformulation  of  comparison  theory  suggests  that  people may 
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discount agreement from those who are similar to them to the extent that they share biasing 
characteristics and that agreement from a dissimilar other increases the probability that the belief 
is valid. Research supports this hypothesis for belief-type opinions—judgments that refer to 
potentially verifiable assertions of reality. When making belief-type judgments, participants 
preferred dissimilar comparison targets and felt more confident in belief type opinions when a 
dissimilar other agreed (Suls et al., 2000). When forming value-type opinions (judgments that 
refer to whether something is right or appropriate for themselves), participants preferred similar 
comparison targets. In the present study, participants read information about a target person, 
which I expected that participants would perceive as verifiable assertions about the target person. 
Thus, initial disagreement in this study may create a sense that the partner is dissimilar enough 
that eventual agreement from him/her feels especially meaningful and valid. This would produce 
a strong sense of shared reality, thus creating the greatest increases in belief certainty and 
epistemic trust. 
Attitude alignment, which occurs when a partner shifts his/her attitude to more closely 
match one’s own attitude, may also produce a greater sense of validity than fortuitous attitude 
similarity (Reid et al., 2013). Compared to pre-existing attitude similarity, which does not 
necessarily provide evidence that the individual’s reasoning for his/her opinion is sound (Sigall, 
1970), attitude alignment is a more active form of feedback that serves as an implicit evaluation 
of the individual or the individual’s argument (Reid et al., 2013). This evaluative component 
could produce a strong sense of shared reality as the partner has been convinced and has shifted 
his/her opinion to match the participant’s view. This should contribute to high levels on  
epistemic outcome variables. 
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Gain-loss theory also supports the prediction that the persuaded agreement condition will 
produce a stronger experience of shared reality than the fortuitous agreement condition (Aronson 
& Linder, 1965). This theory contends that the feeling of gain or loss is extremely important and 
provides a more potent reward or punishment than invariant behavior. That is, one individual can 
reward another and subsequently become liked more though dispensing positive feelings (Sigall, 
1970). This is suggested to be driven by cognitive and affective causes (Aronson & Linder, 
1965). By changing his/her opinion, A shows B that A’s opinion is not due to his/her typical  
style of response but is a function of his/her perception of B’s argument. This suggests that A’s 
opinion is a more meaningful and valuable evaluation. B also experiences the reward of the 
positivity of A agreeing and a reward of the negative feelings initially felt by A’s disagreement 
being reduced. People are attracted to individuals who create and reduce this negative drive state, 
as indicated by findings that gains in esteem (receiving a few negative evaluations followed by 
many positive evaluations) produce higher attraction than consistent high esteem (receiving all 
positive evaluations). As such, a shift from disagreement to agreement by the partner may 
produce a strong experience of shared reality and result in strong epistemic benefits. Levine, 
Ranelli, and Valle (1974) suggest that for the gain-loss effect to occur, the behavior of the target 
must be sufficiently important to the participant. This should be the case in the current study, 
which required cooperation as participants corresponded with the partner and the goal to create 
shared reality should dominate an ambiguous situation (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). 
Finally, regarding the impact of the substance/style variable, I expected that the effect of 
evaluation type would differ by agreement condition (H3). I expected that, in the persuaded 
agreement condition, a substance evaluation would yield a greater experience of shared reality 
and thus, higher epistemic outcomes, compared to a style evaluation because the reason behind
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why the partner came to agree with the participant should matter when reaching agreement in  
this condition. The content of the evaluation in the substance evaluation condition suggests that 
the partner genuinely holds the same inner state about the target (he/she agrees that the 
participant’s reasoning is logical and holds the same opinion about the target), whereas a style 
evaluation does not clearly send this same message to the participant. A style evaluation (in 
which one is praised for his/her style of presentation) may exemplify the superficial success of 
achieving shared reality; the partner comes to agree with the participant’s view, but the 
evaluation made does not reflect the quality or validity of the participant’s argument. This 
evaluation does not inform the participant as to why the partner feels one way or another about 
the target and therefore does not give insight into the partner’s inner state (cf. Prislin et al., 
2006). Without this crucial information, the participant may not be able to recognize that his/her 
inner state matches that of the partner, which is vital to the creation of shared reality (Echterhoff, 
2012; Echterhoff, Higgins, et al., 2009). Agreement based on matters not relevant to the topic or 
argument should not increase certainty of the belief or trust in the other person’s judgment. 
I did not expect this simple effect of evaluation type for the fortuitous agreement 
condition because the evaluation should not matter when the partner has already fortuitously 
agreed the participant. People tend to assume common inner states with others (Echterhoff, 2012; 
Echterhoff, Higgins, et al., 2009). This suggests that in both the substance and style evaluation 
conditions, the participant will infer that his/her inner states matches that of the partner after 
he/she has agreed with the participant and therefore the evaluation variable will not affect the 
impact of fortuitous agreement. I also did not expect this simple effect of evaluation type in the 
disagreement condition because regardless of the evaluation made by the partner, he/she still 
disagrees with the participant and disagreement should not lead to a sense of shared reality and 
thus, epistemic outcomes. 
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In summary, I predicted that the fortuitous and persuaded agreement conditions would 
result in a greater experience of shared reality (H1), higher belief certainty (H2A), and more 
epistemic trust than the no agreement condition (H2A). I also predicted that the relationship 
between agreement type and epistemic outcomes would be mediated by the experience of shared 
reality (H2B). Finally, I predicted Agreement Type X Evaluation Type interactions on the 
measures of shared reality, belief certainty, and epistemic trust. Specifically, I predicted a 
significant simple effect of evaluation type (H3) in the persuaded agreement condition such that  
a substance evaluation would result in a stronger experience of shared reality, higher belief 
certainty, and more epistemic trust compared to a style evaluation, but I did not predict this effect 
in the fortuitous agreement or no agreement condition. 
Although my main focus was on epistemic outcomes, in light of the fact that differences 
in the way in which agreement is reached may also affect interpersonal outcomes—as illustrated 
by Levine and colleagues (1976)—and that a relational motivation is a key feature of shared 
reality theory (Echterhoff, 2012; Echterhoff, Higgins, et al., 2009), I also included relational 
variables for exploratory purposes. 
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2.0 METHOD 
 
 
 
 
2.1 PILOT STUDY 
 
 
I conducted a pilot study to choose a suitable passage for the main study. The goal was to ensure 
that (a) main study participants would be about equally likely to perceive a target person 
described in the passage as positive or negative and (b) the strength of participants' 
positive/negative judgments would be moderate at most. The reason for these criteria was so that 
it would seem plausible to the main study participants that an ostensible partner could disagree 
with their judgment, and that participants would not feel so strongly as to believe an ostensible 
partner would not likely change his or her judgment. 
Thirty participants (14 female; 16 male; M age = 18.40, SD = .72) were recruited from  
the psychology subject pool at the University of Pittsburgh to participate in a lab study on 
evaluations of other people. In this study, participants evaluated two passages, which were 
presented in a counterbalanced order. Passages were used in prior studies (Echterhoff et al., 
2005; Echterhoff, Lang, Kramer, & Higgins, 2009) and included six ambiguous paragraphs 
describing a target person. Passages differed in the qualities of the target being described. Pilot 
participants gave much more positive than negative evaluations to one passage, whereas they 
gave a more equal distribution of positive and negative evaluations to the other passage. The 
latter passage was chosen for the main study (see Appendix for the chosen passage). 
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For the passage that was used in the main study, 19 participants reported a positive 
judgment of the target, and 11 participants reported a negative judgment. Using a continuous 
measure for participants’ judgments, participants had a mean rating of 5.47 (SD = 1.85) on a  
scale ranging from 1 (Very Negative) to 9 (Very positive). The mean did not statistically differ 
from the midpoint of the scale (5), t(29) = 1.38, p = .178. Participants also indicated how 
confident they were in their judgments of the target on a scale from 1 (Not Confident at All) to 9 
(Very Confident). The mean score on this item was 6.57 (SD = 1.81), which did significantly 
differ from the highest endpoint of the scale (9), t(29) = 7.35, p < .001. This suggested that 
participants’ initial views of the target were not extremely strongly held, which was desirable for 
the purposes of the main study. Participants also indicated how a typical undergraduate would 
judge the target on a scale from 1 (Very Negative) to 9 (Very Positive). This item had a mean 
score of 5.23 (SD = 1.79). The mean did not significantly differ from the midpoint of the scale 
(5), t(29) = .71, p = .482. 
On separate questions investigating what percentage of undergraduates would judge the 
target positively and negatively, participants indicated that 52.97% of undergraduates would 
judge the target positively, which did not differ significantly from 50%, t(29) = .65, p = .519, and 
46.70% of undergraduates would judge the target negatively, which did not differ from 50%, 
t(29) = .73, p = .47. Overall, the pilot data suggested that, using the chosen passage, it was likely 
that some participants in the main experiment would judge the target positively and others 
negatively, and that it was plausible to believe that another participant could agree or disagree 
with one’s own positive/negative judgment and could be swayed to change his/her judgment. 
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2.2 MAIN EXPERIMENT 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Participants 
 
 
One hundred and eighty-three individuals (115 female; 68 male; M = 18.95, SD = 1.34) were 
recruited from the psychology subject pool at the University of Pittsburgh to participate in a 
study on evaluations of other people. 
 
2.2.2 Procedure 
 
 
The main lab study employed a 3 (agreement type: fortuitous, persuaded, or no agreement) X 2 
(evaluation type: substance or style) between-participants design. Participants were randomly 
assigned to conditions. For a breakdown of the number of participants per cell, see Table 1. 
Participants came to the lab and learned that an ostensible other participant would be completing 
the same study in a different room than they. Participants then were taken to a lab room and 
given the ambiguous passage previously described in the pilot study section (see Appendix) that 
described a target person. After reading the passage, participants reported their judgment of this 
person (positive/negative) and how certain they felt about their initial judgment. Items are 
described in detail in the Measures subsection. Next, the experimenter told each participant 
whether he/she and the ostensible other participant (hereafter referred to as the “partner”) agreed 
or disagreed on their judgment (positive/negative) of the target depending on condition. In the 
fortuitous agreement condition, the participant was told that he/she and the partner agreed about 
the target. In the persuaded agreement and no agreement conditions, the participant was told that 
he/she and the partner did not agree about the target. 
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Participants were then asked to explain their judgment of the target person to the partner 
by creating an audio recording that was ostensibly heard by the partner. Several minutes after 
completing the recording, the participant was given a written response, ostensibly from the 
partner, that indicated the partner’s current judgment of the target—that is, the partner’s  
judgment after he/she listened to the participant’s explanation of the reasons for his/her own 
judgment. The partner ostensibly responded to the item “In general, how would you evaluate the 
person you just read about? (Positive/Negative)” by circling his/her answer and responded to the 
open-ended item “What comments do you have for the other participant after listening to his/her 
audio tape?” by writing his/her comments in a free response blank. In the fortuitous agreement 
condition, the partner circled the same judgment as the participant did (positive/negative). In the 
persuaded agreement condition, the partner also circled the same judgment as the participant did. 
In the no agreement condition, the partner circled the opposite judgment as the participant did. 
The written response to the participant included a one sentence evaluation of the 
participant’s audio recording which differed by condition. In the substance evaluation condition, 
the participant read “You had very good arguments and your reasons were very logical” (with an 
added phrase of “but my view hasn’t changed” for the no agreement condition), and in the style 
evaluation condition, the participant read “Your presentation style was impressive and I enjoyed 
listening to your speech” (with an added phrase of “but my view hasn’t changed” for the no 
agreement condition). Finally, the participant filled out several dependent measures including 
epistemic outcomes, a measure of shared reality, manipulation checks, and demographic 
information. Because shared reality includes a relational motivation, participants also completed 
exploratory measures focusing on their relationship with the partner. 
20  
At the end of the study, the experimenter probed participants for suspicion before 
debriefing participants, explaining the deception and its purpose, and telling participants that  
they could withdraw their data if they wished to do so. Finally, participants were thanked and 
granted credit. 
 
2.2.3 Measures 
 
 
Measures are described in the order in which they were administered. 
 
 
2.2.3.1 Initial belief (positive/negative) Participants completed a  one-item  measure  to 
assess their initial judgment (positive/negative) of the target in the passage. Participants 
responded  to the  question  “In  general,  how  would  you   evaluate   the   person   you   just 
read   about? (Positive/Negative)” by circling their answer. 
 
 
2.2.3.2 Initial belief  certainty  Participants  completed  a  one-item  measure   to   assess 
their initial certainty in their  judgment  of  the  target  in  the  passage.  Participants  responded  
to the question “How certain are you in your evaluation about that  person?”  on  a  7-point  
Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at All) to 7 (Extremely). Higher scores indicate higher initial 
certainty. 
 
 
2.2.3.3 Epistemic outcomes 
 
Post-manipulation belief certainty. Participants completed four questions designed to 
assess how certain they were in their judgment of the target person after receiving feedback from 
the partner. The questions “How certain are you in your evaluation about the person described in
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the passage?,” “How confident are you in your evaluation of the person described in the 
passage?,” “How doubtful are you of your evaluation about the person described in the 
passage?,” and “How clear is your evaluation about the person described in the passage?” were 
answered using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at All) to 7 (Extremely). Scores on the 
third item were reversed scored and then items were averaged to create a post-manipulation 
belief certainty composite (α = .81). Higher scores indicate higher belief certainty. 
Epistemic trust. Whereas belief certainty assesses certainty about the specific belief, this 
epistemic trust measure was meant to tap more general beliefs regarding whether one can trust 
the other person’s judgments beyond the specific belief. Participants completed a 4-item  
measure of epistemic trust adapted from a study conducted by Echterhoff and  colleagues (2008). 
The questions “Is the other participant a trustworthy source of information about the person 
described in the passage?,” “Does the other participant seem to be a reliable source of 
knowledge?,” “Is the other participant a trustworthy source of information about other people in 
general?,” and “Does the other participant seem to be trustworthy?” were answered using a 7- 
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at All) to 7 (Very Much). Scores on these items were 
averaged to create an epistemic trust composite (α = .86). Higher scores indicate higher trust in 
the partner’s judgments. 
 
 
2.2.3.4 Experience of shared reality Participants completed five questions designed to 
assess their experience of shared reality with the partner. I expected that a composite index of 
shared reality would serve as a mediator of the relationship between agreement type and 
epistemic outcomes. Participants responded to the questions “By the end of the study, the other 
participant and I are on the same wavelength about the person described in the passage,” “By the 
end of the study, the other participant and I understand the person described in the passage in the 
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same way,” “By the end of the study, the other participant and I experienced the same thoughts 
and feelings about the person described in the passage,” “By the end of the study, the other 
participant and I had trouble seeing each other’s perspectives about the person described in the 
passage,” and “By the end of the study, the other participant and I share the same view of the 
person described in the passage” using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) 
to 7 (Strongly Agree). Scores on the fourth item were reversed scored and then items were 
averaged to create an experience of shared reality composite (α = .95). Higher scores indicate a 
greater sense of shared reality with the partner. 
 
 
2.2.3.5 Relational outcomes 
 
Perceived responsiveness. Participants completed a version of the 12-item Perceived 
Responsiveness Scale (Reis, 2006) that was modified to fit the context of meeting a new person. 
This measure included items such as, “Compared to most experiences I’ve had meeting 
somebody new, I get the feeling that this person sees the ‘real’ me” and “Compared to most 
experiences I’ve had meeting somebody new, I get the feeling that this person is responsive to  
my needs.” Items were answered using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not At All True) to 
7 (Completely True). Scores were averaged to create a perceived responsiveness composite (α  = 
.92). Higher scores indicate greater perceived responsiveness. 
Liking. Participants answered two questions (r[164] = .57, p < .001) to measure how 
much they liked the other participant. The questions “How much do you like the other 
participant?” and “How much do you respect the other participant?” were answered using a 7- 
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at All) to 7 (Extremely). Scores were averaged to create a 
liking composite. Higher scores indicate greater liking of the partner. 
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Relational trust. Participants completed a 3-item measure of relational trust adapted from 
a 5-item measure used by Echterhoff, Lang, and colleagues (2009). The questions “How close 
do you feel to the other participant?,” “Do you feel comfortable working together with the other 
participant?,” and “How connected do you feel to the other participant?” were answered using a 
7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at All) to 7 (Extremely). Scores were averaged to create 
a relational trust composite (α = .75). Higher numbers indicate greater trust. 
 
 
2.2.3.6 Manipulation checks 
 
Initial and final agreement with the partner. Participants responded to one item that 
assessed whether they accurately perceived the partner’s agreement pattern. In response to the 
question “Over the course of the study, how did your opinion and the opinion of the other 
participant about the person described in the passage relate?,” each participant indicated that 
he/she and the partner either agreed before communicating and agreed after communicating; 
disagreed before communicating and disagreed after communicating; agreed before 
communicating and disagreed after communicating; or disagreed before communicating and 
disagreed after communicating. 
Evaluation type. Participants were asked to indicate what the partner said in response to 
their communication. This was an open-ended question. Participants were evaluated as correctly 
indicating what the partner had said if they reported that the partner had complimented their 
logical argument in the substance evaluation condition or complimented  their style of 
presentation in the style evaluation condition. I categorized each response as correctly indicating 
what the partner had said or not and planned to have a second coder rate any ambiguous 
responses, however, each response clearly and correctly indicated what the partner had said. 
Self-efficacy. Aronson and Linder (1965) suggest that by changing his/her opinion from 
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negative to positive, one person provides another person with an experience of success, which 
could lead to feelings of efficacy or competence. For this reason, I expected that the persuaded 
agreement condition would produce higher feelings of efficacy than the fortuitous agreement 
condition. I used this as a manipulation check to ensure that the two types of agreement 
(fortuitous and persuaded agreement) led to different experiences of reaching that agreement 
with the partner. Participants completed two sets of questions designed to measure self-efficacy: 
one set to tap feelings of efficacy that were specific to the paradigm of persuading a partner to 
agree and one set to tap general feelings of self-efficacy. The first, more specific, self-efficacy 
questions were: “I believe that I was successful in convincing the other participant to agree with 
my evaluation of the person described in the passage,” “I feel that I had an influence on the other 
participant’s final evaluation of the person described in the passage,” “I feel that I am bad at 
convincing others of my viewpoint,” “I am the type of person who is confident when explaining 
my viewpoint to others,” and “I am better than most people at convincing others to agree with 
my position about something.” These items were answered using a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). Scores on the third item were reversed scored 
and then items were averaged to create a manipulation-specific self-efficacy composite (α = .71). 
The second, more general self-efficacy questions were from an 8-item measure developed by 
Chen, Gully, and Eden (2001). Representative questions were “I will be able to successfully 
overcome many challenges,” "I will be able to achieve most of the goals that I have set for 
myself,"  and "Even  when  things  are tough,  I  can  perform quite  well." These  questions were
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answered using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). 
Scores were averaged to create a general self-efficacy composite (α = .93). Higher scores on the 
first measure indicated greater efficacy in persuading the partner to agree, and higher scores on 
the second measure indicated greater general feelings of self-efficacy. 
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3.0 RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
Exclusion criteria were decided on a priori. Data from seventeen participants were excluded 
from analyses: six participants who expressed suspicion about the ostensible partner and 11 
participants who failed the manipulation check regarding their initial and final agreement status 
with their partner by indicating a pattern of agreement from the partner that was different than 
their assigned condition. 
All analyses were two-way ANOVAs with agreement type and evaluation type as 
independent variables and included initial belief certainty as a covariate unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
 
 
3.1 INITIAL BELIEF (POSTIVE/NEGATIVE) 
 
 
Participants answered one question to assess their initial judgment of the target in the passage. 
Eighty participants (48.2%) indicated that they had a positive judgment of the target and 86 
participants (51.8%) indicated that they had a negative judgment of the target. 
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3.2 INITIAL BELIEF CERTAINTY 
 
 
I conducted a two-way ANOVA to determine whether the conditions differed in the  certainty 
with which participants held their beliefs about their judgment prior to the manipulation. The 
mean initial certainty score was 4.67 (SD = 1.02) on a 7-point scale. There was an unexpected 
main effect of evaluation type on this measure, F(1, 160) = 5.59, p = .019, partial η2 = .034: 
Participants who were later assigned to the style evaluation condition were more certain initially 
about their judgment (M = 4.86, SD = .87) than were those who were later assigned to the 
substance evaluation condition (M = 4.49, SD = 1.12). Therefore, I included initial belief 
certainty as a covariate in subsequent analyses of variables of interest. Because of the inclusion  
of the covariate, I report standard errors instead of standard deviations in subsequent results. If 
the pattern of results changed when the covariate was not included, I note this in a footnote. As 
expected, neither the main effect of agreement type nor the Agreement Type X Evaluation Type 
interaction was significant, Fs < 2.09. 
 
 
 
3.3 MANIPULATION CHECKS 
 
 
Before proceeding to examine key dependent variables, I first looked at the manipulation checks 
to ensure that conditions differed in the intended ways. 
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3.3.1 Initial and final agreement with the partner 
 
 
Participants answered one question to assess whether they accurately perceived the partner’s 
agreement pattern. As described above, data from 11 participants who indicated an agreement 
pattern that differed from the condition to which they were randomly assigned were excluded 
from data analysis. 
 
3.3.2 Evaluation type 
 
 
Participants responded to an open-ended question regarding what the partner said in response to 
their communication. No participant indicated a response from the partner that differed from the 
response (substance/style evaluation) that was actually provided to the participant. 
 
3.3.3 Self-efficacy 
 
 
I included two measures of self-efficacy: one that tapped feelings of efficacy specific to 
persuading the partner to agree and a general measure of self-efficacy. I had expected that 
participants in the persuaded agreement condition would feel more efficacy than those in the 
fortuitous agreement or no agreement conditions. For the more specific self-efficacy measure,  
the mean self-efficacy score was 4.60 (SD = 1.07) on a 7-point scale. There was a main effect of 
agreement type, F(2, 159) = 41.27, p < .001, partial η2 = .38. The agreement conditions differed 
as expected: The persuaded agreement condition led to significantly greater feelings of efficacy 
(M = 5.29, SD = .97) than the fortuitous agreement condition (M = 4.82, SD = .92), p < .001, and 
the  no  agreement  (M  =  3.77,  SD  =  .70)  condition,  p  <  .001. Participants  in  the fortuitous
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agreement condition also felt higher feelings of efficacy than did those in the no agreement 
condition, p = .006. Neither the main effect of evaluation type nor the interaction was significant, 
Fs < 1. 
For the more general measure, the mean self-efficacy score was 5.33 (SD = .87) on a 7- 
point scale. The two-way ANOVA yielded neither a main effect of agreement type or evaluation 
type, nor an interaction, Fs < 1.18. 
In sum, the manipulation checks revealed that the conditions differed in the intended 
ways: Most participants accurately reported information relevant to their agreement type and 
evaluation type and the persuaded agreement condition elicited greater feelings of self-efficacy 
than the fortuitous and no agreement conditions on the measure that tapped self-efficacy specific 
to the manipulation of persuading the partner to agree. 
 
 
 
3.4 EXPERIENCE OF SHARED REALITY 
 
 
The mean experience of shared reality score was 4.08 (SD = 1.94) on a 7-point scale. The two- 
way ANOVA yielded a main effect of agreement type, F(2, 158) = 211.31, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.728. Planned comparisons revealed that the two agreement conditions (M = 5.11, SE = .14) led 
to a significantly greater experience of shared reality compared to the no agreement condition (M 
= 1.89, SE = .14), F(1, 158) = 357.07, p < .001. Further analyses revealed that the fortuitous 
agreement condition (M = 5.78, SE = .13) resulted in more shared reality than the persuaded 
agreement condition (M = 4.43, SE = .15), p < .001, which differed in turn from the  no 
agreement condition, p < .001. Neither the main effect of evaluation type nor the interaction was 
significant,  Fs  <  1. To  summarize,  H1  was  supported:  Agreeing  with  the  partner,    either 
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fortuitously or by persuasion, led to a greater experience of shared reality than not agreeing with 
the partner. 
I then looked at the simple effect of evaluation type in the persuaded agreement  
condition. Contrary to H3, evaluation type did not produce differences in the experience of 
shared reality in the persuaded agreement condition, p = .701. 
Next, I sought to determine whether the conditions also affected belief certainty and 
epistemic trust—two variables that shared reality theory and relevant research suggest should be 
associated with the experience of shared reality. 
 
 
 
3.5 EPISTEMIC OUTCOMES 
 
 
3.5.1 Post-manipulation belief certainty 
 
 
The mean post-manipulation belief certainty score was 4.91 (SD = 1.01) on a 7-point scale. The 
two-way ANOVA supported predictions: In support of H2A, a main effect of agreement type 
emerged, F(2, 159) = 3.20, p = .043, partial η2 = .0391. Planned comparisons confirmed that the 
two agreement conditions (M = 4.99, SE = .09) led to higher belief certainty than the no 
agreement (M = 4.75, SE = .09) condition, F(1, 159) = 5.49, p = .02. Although I expected that the 
agreement condition that yielded the greatest experience of shared reality (as it happened, 
fortuitous agreement) would yield the highest post-manipulation belief certainty, there was no 
significant difference in post-manipulation belief certainty between the fortuitous agreement (M 
 
 
1 When initial belief certainty is not entered as a covariate in the model, neither the main effects of agreement type 
or evaluation type nor the interaction are significant, Fs < 2.15. 
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= 5.04, SE = .08) and persuaded agreement (M = 4.94, SE = .09) conditions, p = .42. The main 
effect for evaluation type was not significant, F < 1. However, there was a significant Agreement 
Type x Evaluation Type interaction, F(2, 159) = 4.98, p = .008, partial η2 = .059. 
Following up on this interaction, I compared the style and substance conditions in the 
persuaded agreement condition to determine whether belief certainty differed by evaluation type 
in this specific agreement condition (H3). There was a marginal difference between the two 
evaluation types within the persuaded agreement condition, F(1, 159) = 3.60, p = .06, but this 
difference was in the opposite direction to what I expected: Participants who received a style 
evaluation (M = 5.12, SE = .13) felt more certain than participants who received a substance 
evaluation (M = 4.78, SE = 4.77). A posteriori analyses also revealed an unexpected simple  
effect of evaluation type in the no agreement condition, F(1, 159) = 6.61, p = .011: In this case, 
participants who received a substance evaluation (M = 4.97, SE = .12) felt more certain than 
participants who received a style evaluation (M = 4.53, SE = .13). Those participants in the no 
agreement condition who received a substance evaluation also felt as certain as participants in 
either agreement condition did, F(2,159) = 1.56, p = .214. I discuss these findings further in the 
Discussion section. 
 
3.5.2 Epistemic trust 
 
 
The mean epistemic trust score was 4.47 (SD = 1.94) on a 7-point scale. The two-way ANOVA 
supported predictions: In accordance with H2A, a main effect of agreement type emerged, F(2, 
159) = 6.58, p =.002, partial η2 = .076. Planned comparisons revealed that the two agreement 
conditions (M = 4.61, SE = .13) led to significantly higher epistemic trust in the partner  
compared to the no agreement condition (M = 4.18, SE=.13), F(1, 159) = 6.86, p = .010. In other 
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words, participants who initially agreed with the partner or persuaded the partner to share their 
evaluation reported feeling that they could trust the partner's judgments more than those who did 
not agree with the partner. This parallels the effect on post-manipulation belief certainty and 
supports H2A that the two agreement conditions would lead to higher epistemic benefits 
compared to no agreement. Further analyses revealed that the fortuitous agreement condition (M 
= 4.83, SE = .12) also resulted in higher epistemic trust compared to the persuaded agreement 
condition (M = 4.38, SE = .14), p = .02. Although I was agnostic about the relative impact of the 
two agreement conditions, this finding is in accord with my expectation that the agreement 
condition that yielded the greatest experience of shared reality would elicit more epistemic trust 
than the other agreement condition. 
Neither the main effect of evaluation type nor the interaction was significant, Fs < 1.99. 
Contrary to H3 and paralleling the effect on the experience of shared reality variable, the simple 
effect of evaluation type in the persuaded agreement condition was not significant, F(1, 159) = 
2.92, p = .09. 
 
 
 
3.6 MEDIATION ANALYSES 
 
 
3.6.1 Post-manipulation belief certainty 
 
 
Because there was a significant interaction between the two independent variables on post- 
manipulation belief certainty, I conducted a moderated mediation analysis using PROCESS 
(Model 15, Hayes, 2013). This model allows for a test of moderated mediation in which the 
predictor variable predicts an outcome (with the possibility that this path is moderated) and a
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mediator, and a mediator predicts an outcome, with the path from the mediator to the outcome 
variable also moderated. Agreement type was the predictor, post-manipulation belief certainty 
was the outcome variable, the experience of shared reality was the mediator, and evaluation type 
was the moderator. Because agreement type was multi-categorical, I used dummy codes with the 
no agreement condition serving as the reference group. I ran Model 15 twice to obtain all of the 
parameter estimates: once with the fortuitous agreement/no agreement comparison (with the 
persuaded agreement/no agreement comparison entered as a covariate) and once with the 
persuaded agreement/no agreement comparison (with the fortuitous agreement/no agreement 
comparison entered as a covariate). Initial belief certainty was also entered as a covariate in each 
model as in the analyses of main dependent variables. 
The confidence interval for each conditional indirect effect included zero, suggesting that 
there was no moderated mediation: For the persuaded agreement/no agreement comparison, the 
indirect effect of condition on belief certainty via the experience of shared reality was not 
significant for participants in the style evaluation condition, 95% CI = -.27 to .94, or for 
participants in the substance evaluation condition, 95% CI = -.87 to .17. For the persuaded 
agreement/no agreement comparison, this same conditional indirect effect was not significant in 
either the style evaluation condition, 95% CI = -.19 to .51, or in the substance evaluation 
condition, 95% CI = -.41 to .27. Thus, the portion of H2B that concerned belief certainty was not 
supported; the experience of shared reality did not mediate the relationship between agreement 
type and post-manipulation belief certainty at either level of evaluation type. 
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3.6.2 Epistemic trust 
 
 
Because there was only a main effect of agreement type on epistemic trust (and not an 
Agreement Type x Evaluation Type interaction), I tested for simple mediation using PROCESS 
(Model 4, Hayes, 2013) to run a bootstrap analysis with 5000 resamples. This technique uses 
regression to model the effects of the predictor: (a) directly on the outcome variable, (b) directly 
on the mediator, and (c) indirectly on the outcome variable via the mediator. The output of this 
technique includes a 95% confidence interval for each estimate. Agreement type was the 
predictor, epistemic trust was the dependent variable, and the experience of shared reality was 
considered as a mediator. Initial belief certainty and evaluation type were included as covariates. 
The predictor variable, agreement type, was multi-categorical. Because PROCESS is able to run 
Model 4 with a multicategorical predictor, I was able to run just one model that included all 
parameter estimates. PROCESS first dummy-coded the predictor variable into two separate 
predictor terms: one predictor consisting of the fortuitous agreement/no agreement comparison 
and one predictor consisting of the persuaded agreement/no agreement comparison (see Hayes & 
Preacher, 2014, for details). The no agreement condition was chosen as the reference group 
because it was used as a control condition. 
The confidence interval for the indirect effect of agreement type on epistemic trust via 
the experience of shared reality did not include zero for fortuitous agreement compared to the no 
agreement reference group, 95% CI = .30 to 1.51, or for the persuaded agreement condition 
compared to the no agreement reference group, 95% CI = .18 to 1.03. Thus, shared reality is a 
mediator of the relationship between both fortuitous and persuaded agreement (compared to no 
agreement) conditions and epistemic trust. This supports the portion of H2B that concerned 
epistemic trust; participants felt a greater experience of shared reality in each of the agreement
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conditions compared to the no agreement condition and this experience of shared reality, in turn, 
was associated with greater epistemic trust. 
 
 
 
3.7 RELATIONAL OUTCOMES 
 
 
Although my focus was on epistemic outcomes, I included some relational measures for 
exploratory purposes. All analyses were two-way ANOVAs with agreement type and evaluation 
type as independent variables and included initial belief certainty as a covariate unless otherwise 
indicated. Descriptive statistics are reported in tables for these exploratory variables. 
 
3.7.1 Perceived responsiveness 
 
 
The mean perceived responsiveness score was 2.85 (SD = .98) on a 7-point scale. The usual 
ANOVA yielded neither a main effect of agreement type nor evaluation type, nor a significant 
interaction, Fs < 2.33
2
. See Table 2 for means and standard errors. 
 
3.7.2 Liking 
 
 
The mean liking score was 5.07 (SD = .95) on a 7-point scale. The two-way ANOVA yielded a 
main effect of evaluation type, F(1, 159) = 9.30, p = .003, partial η2 = .055: Participants who 
received a style evaluation (M = 5.58, SE = .18) liked the partner more than those who received a 
 
 
2 When initial belief certainty is not entered as a covariate, the main effect of type of evaluation becomes marginally 
significant, F(1, 158) = 3.58, p = .06, partial η2 = .022, such that a style evaluation (M = 2.99, SD = .95) led to 
higher perceived responsiveness than a substance evaluation (M = 2.72, SD = 1.00). 
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substance evaluation (M = 4.69, SE = .17). This was qualified by a significant interaction, F(2, 
159) = 3.59, p = .03, partial η2 = .043. Planned analyses revealed that a style evaluation led to 
more liking than a substance evaluation in the no agreement condition, F(1, 159) = 13.12, p < 
.001. However, this simple effect was not significant in the persuaded agreement or no 
agreement conditions, Fs < 2.81. See Table 3 for means and standard errors. The main effect of 
agreement type was not significant, F < 1. 
 
3.7.3 Relational trust 
 
 
The mean relational trust score was 3.11 (SD = 1.06) on a 7-point scale. The two-way ANOVA 
yielded a main effect of evaluation type, F(1, 159) = 6.75, p = .01, partial η2 = .041: A style 
evaluation (M = 3.32, SE = .11) resulted in more relational trust than a substance evaluation (M = 
2.91, SE = .11). This was qualified by a significant Agreement Type x Evaluation Type 
interaction, F(2, 159) = 5.17, p = .007, partial η2 = .061. Subsequent analyses revealed that a  
style evaluation led to more relational trust than a substance evaluation in the no agreement 
condition, F(1, 159) = 15.99, p < .001. However, in the persuaded agreement condition and in  
the fortuitous agreement condition, evaluation type did not affect relational trust, Fs < 1. The 
main effect of agreement type was not significant, F < 1.37. This pattern of results parallels the 
pattern of results described above on liking. See Table 4 for means and standard errors. 
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4.0 DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
 
The primary goal of the present study was to determine whether the way in which agreement is 
achieved impacts one’s experience of shared reality and thus, the epistemic consequences that 
arise. I hypothesized and found that the fortuitous and persuaded agreement conditions would 
result in a greater experience of shared reality than the no agreement condition (H1). Subsequent 
analyses also revealed that the fortuitous agreement condition led to a greater experience of 
shared reality than the persuaded agreement condition, which led to a greater experience of 
shared reality than the no agreement condition. Past research has discussed the benefits of 
creating shared reality (e.g. Echterhoff et al., 2005; Echterhoff et al., 2008; Echterhoff, Lang, et 
al., 2009; Kopietz, Echterhoff, Niemeir, Hellmann, & Memon 2009; Kopietz, Hellmann,  
Higgins, & Echterhoff, 2010), however these benefits are always discussed in comparison to a 
condition in which shared reality was not created. This is the first experiment that I am aware of 
to illustrate that different ways of reaching agreement can result in different experiences of  
shared reality. This highlights the importance of considering how one comes to create a shared 
reality with a partner or partners when considering what benefits creating a shared reality will 
elicit. 
I also hypothesized that the fortuitous and persuaded agreement conditions would result  
in higher belief certainty and epistemic trust compared to the no agreement condition (H2A) and 
that these relationships would be mediated by the experience of shared reality (H2B). Regarding
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belief certainty, H2A was supported, however H2B was not supported: Participants in the 
fortuitous and persuaded agreement conditions felt more certain than participants in the no 
agreement condition, but this was not mediated by the experience of shared reality at either level 
of evaluation type. There was an unexpected interaction of agreement type and evaluation type  
on belief certainty as well. In the no agreement condition, participants who received a substance 
evaluation were more certain than participants who received a style evaluation. Participants in  
the no agreement condition who received a substance evaluation felt just as certain as  
participants who received a substance evaluation and did come to agree with the partner, either 
fortuitously or by persuasion. This suggests that participants were able to achieve a sense of 
certainty in their belief about the target person’s positivity/negativity either through reaching 
agreement with the partner or by reading that the partner thought the participant had a logical 
argument. Whereas research has demonstrated that a shared view increases certainty (Gudykunst 
& Nishida, 1984; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; McGarty et al., 1993) and validity (Echterhoff, 2012; 
Echterhoff, Higgins, et al., 2009; Newcomb, 1953), the current project suggests that perhaps an 
evaluation from the partner suggesting that one’s argument is logical may indicate partial 
agreement or at least enough social support for one’s view to enhance people’s belief certainty 
even when the partner reports a belief that is different than one’s own. Though the partner does 
not share the same inner state as the participant, which is required to create a complete sense of 
shared reality, a substance evaluation in this case may suggest that the partner understands and 
approves of the participant’s inner state enough to create some degree of shared reality between 
the pair. 
Also in support of H2A, participants in the fortuitous and persuaded agreement 
conditions felt greater epistemic trust (i.e., felt that they could rely on the partner to provide valid 
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judgments) than participants in the no agreement condition. Past research has used epistemic  
trust as a measure of shared reality and as a mediator to explain the relationship between 
conditions that were expected to create shared reality (vs. conditions not expected to result in 
shared reality) and recall bias, using the Saying-Is-Believing paradigm (Echterhoff et al, 2005; 
Echterhoff et al., 2008; Echterhoff, Lang, et al., 2009). I treated epistemic trust as an outcome 
that I expected would follow from the experience of shared reality—a variable that I measured 
separately. I expected that participants would first feel a sense of shared reality with their partner 
as a result of sharing an inner state about a target and that this experience of shared reality would 
lead them to come to trust that partner’s judgments more globally (increased epistemic trust). 
Indeed, the fortuitous agreement condition yielded a greater experience of shared reality than the 
persuaded agreement condition and also resulted in more epistemic trust. In support of H2B, the 
experience of shared reality mediated the relationship between agreement type and epistemic 
trust: Participants in the fortuitous and persuaded agreement conditions felt a greater experience 
of shared reality than those in the no agreement condition and this, in turn, led them to view the 
partner as a reliable source of knowledge beyond the specific evaluation. This suggests that the 
experience of shared reality may be a precursor to epistemic trust, although I am cautious about 
making causal inferences based on the correlation between these measured variables. 
Nonetheless, researchers may find it fruitful to measure the experience of shared reality in future 
studies in addition to the implications of that experience (e.g., epistemic trust). 
Finally, I hypothesized that a substance evaluation would lead to greater shared reality, 
belief certainty, and epistemic trust than a style evaluation, specifically in the persuaded 
agreement condition (H3). This hypothesis was not supported. There was an unexpected and 
marginally significant effect of evaluation type in the opposite direction than was expected on
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post-manipulation belief certainty. Although I am cautious not to over interpret a marginal effect, 
it is possible that participants perceived a style evaluation as a more rewarding evaluation than I 
had anticipated. Perhaps participants perceived the style evaluation as a compliment on how they 
presented their rationale and also a compliment on their actual argument (even though there was 
no explicit mention of their argument quality in this condition) and that a substance evaluation 
only provided a compliment on their argument. This provides a possible explanation of why I did 
not find the expected difference between substance and style conditions in the persuaded 
agreement condition. 
 
 
 
4.1 EXPLORATORY RELATIONAL OUTCOMES 
 
 
Although I did not find any significant effects on perceived responsiveness, there was a 
consistent pattern of results across the liking and relational trust variables. On each of these 
variables, there was a main effect of evaluation type: A style evaluation led to increased liking 
and more relational trust than a substance evaluation. This was qualified by a significant 
interaction: Participants who received a style evaluation liked the partner more and felt greater 
relational trust than participants who received a substance evaluation, but only in the no 
agreement condition. It may be the case that participants perceived the partner who did not agree 
with them as still trying to maintain a relationship with them by providing a style evaluation, but 
perceived the partner who praised their logical arguments and refused to change his/her opinion 
as not wanting to develop a relationship with them. Participants might also have viewed the 
partner who disagreed but provided a style evaluation as providing a more global compliment 
than when he/she provided a substance evaluation. This might explain why those participants  in 
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the no agreement condition liked and trusted the partner more when they received a style 
evaluation than a substance evaluation. In the agreement conditions, evaluation type did not 
affect how much participants liked the partner or how much relational trust they felt. Agreement 
should be rewarding in itself because sharing inner states leads to liking (Echterhoff, Higgins, et 
al., 2009; Miller, 2001) and attraction (Byrne, 1962; Byrne, 1971; Finkel & Eastwick, 2015; 
Miller, 2001). These results suggest that agreement is equally rewarding regardless of what 
evaluation type that it is paired with. 
Surprisingly, the main effect of agreement type was not significant. This contrasts with 
previous work that has demonstrated that sharing inner states results in greater  liking  
(Echterhoff, Higgins, et al, 2009; Miller, 2001) and attraction (Byrne, 1962; Byrne, 1971, Finkel 
& Eastwick, 2015; Miller, 2001). Perhaps the inclusion of the partner’s evaluation of the 
participants’ communication overwhelmed the impact of agreement type; all participants 
received some sort of praise from the partner regardless of whether the partner agreed with them 
or not. This evaluation may be more meaningful than just learning whether the partner views the 
target negatively or positively because the evaluation is self-relevant to the participant. Thus, 
evaluation type may be more relevant to relational outcomes. 
 
 
 
4.2 LIMITATIONS 
 
 
Although I did find that the experience of shared reality mediated the effect of agreement type on 
epistemic trust, I did not find evidence that shared reality mediated the effect of agreement type 
on belief certainty. Thus, H2B was partially supported. Both the epistemic trust and belief 
certainty measures had high (and similar) reliability, suggesting that measurement error is not
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likely the cause for this difference. However, there may be something theoretically different 
between these two outcomes that I had not anticipated. Perhaps agreement type affects the 
experience of shared reality, which leaves a lasting impact on psychologically distant  and 
abstract views and beliefs (thus leading to trusting someone’s judgments as reliable and valid 
beyond the specific believe at hand), but specific judgments that the individual has already made 
are less impacted by this. The heightened experience of shared reality in the fortuitous condition 
may have led participants to trust the partner as a valid source of knowledge in general, but 
perhaps did not affect belief certainty because participants had already formed their beliefs prior 
to learning about the partner's views. 
Previous research has suggested that, when motivated to create a sense of shared reality, 
participants feel more certain in their view by reducing uncertainty through audience tuning and 
that audience tuning leads to memory bias (Kopietz et al., 2009). After reading a passage about 
an ambiguous target, participants described that target to an audience in either a positively or 
negatively skewed way based on the audience’s previously held belief about that target (message 
bias). Participants subsequently remembered the target in a way that was consistent with their 
positively or negatively tuned message (recall bias). Both message bias and recall bias were 
significantly and positively correctly with confidence in one’s belief, but only for participants 
with a shared reality motive. In the current study, participants did not tune their messages to the 
audience, which may have been a necessary step in getting the experience of shared reality to 
predict post-manipulation belief certainty. This possibility could be addressed in future research. 
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4.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
 
In this study, I was interested in how ways of arriving at agreement lead to differences in 
epistemic outcomes through the experience of shared reality. To investigate this, I used a 
fortuitous agreement condition and a persuaded agreement condition (plus a no agreement 
condition for comparison). Even though the former two conditions both involved agreement,  
they differed in an important way: Persuading another to agree enhanced feelings of self-efficacy 
compared to fortuitous agreement. Although I predicted this difference, future studies should 
include a change condition that does not enhance efficacy on the part of the participant. For 
example, a condition could be included in which the participant believes that the partner 
fortuitously changes his/her mind before the participant has had a chance to communicate his/her 
rationale for his/her opinion. Future studies may also examine other types of agreement such as 
the participant being persuaded by or reaching a compromise with the partner. It would be 
interesting to know whether reaching agreement by changing one’s own inner state or initial 
belief to some degree would have different implications for shared reality and epistemic 
outcomes compared to reaching agreement while maintaining one’s original position. 
Future studies may also investigate the effects of creating multiple shared realities with 
another person and then disagreeing on a new topic. Perhaps this would have consequences for 
future agreement and epistemic trust, willingness and desire to work together, or responsiveness 
to this person. One potentially interesting possibility to explore would be whether having 
established prior shared realities can buffer against negative consequences of disagreement, such 
as disliking or unwillingness to compromise. 
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4.4 STRENGTHS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
This is the first experimental study to investigate how ways of reaching agreement affect 
epistemic outcomes. It is also the first to examine shared reality as a mechanism for any such 
differences. This extends previous work on shared reality, which has used epistemic trust as a 
measure of shared reality (Echterhoff et al., 2005; Echterhoff et al., 2008), by highlighting the 
importance of capturing the experience of shared reality that leads to feelings of epistemic trust. 
Previous work has involved manipulation of motives to achieve shared reality (Echterhoff et al., 
2005; Echterhoff et al., 2008). In contrast, in the current study, I manipulated experiences that 
people go through in daily life and used a measure of the subjective experience of shared reality 
to illustrate how these typical experiences affect the experience of shared reality and how that 
experience is translated into the extent to which one feels that one can rely on the other as a valid 
source of knowledge to base one’s opinion on. Capturing the experience of shared reality instead 
of skipping right to the epistemic trust that it appears to facilitate may be a more ecologically 
valid way to understand this process in the real world. 
The findings of the present study have several important implications. Shared reality is an 
important mechanism by which social, cultural, and political beliefs and knowledge are created 
and maintained. This study demonstrated that different ways of reaching agreement produce 
different experiences of shared reality, which provides insight into features that shape people’s 
beliefs and knowledge—whether and how people came to agree. This study provides evidence 
that one’s experience of shared reality was associated with feelings of epistemic trust. This 
endorsement of relying on the other person’s judgments as a valid source of knowledge may 
facilitate future agreement and even lead people to rely on this other person’s judgments on other 
topics, possibly without considering opposing information. This may help explain how pairs or
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groups may come to fast decisions without considering all of the information available (e.g., 
groupthink; Janis, 1982). Especially when there is a strong sense of shared reality, particular  
types of agreement (i.e., fortuitous agreement) may lead people to trust one another’s judgments 
somewhat blindly. 
This study and future studies in this area may also inform strategies for negotiation and 
conflict resolution, as well as shed light on how to maintain and build harmony in a relationship. 
I found that evaluation type was particularly important when the participant and the partner did 
not agree. That is, among participants whose partners continued to disagree with them, those  
who received a style evaluation liked and trusted the partner more than those who received a 
substance evaluation. Yet, among these same participants whose partners continued to disagree 
with them, those who received a substance evaluation experienced greater belief certainty than 
those who received a style evaluation. A substance evaluation in the no agreement condition also 
led to a level of certainty that matched that of participants who experienced agreement with the 
partner. This suggests that when people disagree with someone, the evaluation that they provide 
can affect how that individual feels both about the other person who provides the evaluation and 
about his/her own opinion. This may inform the use of different strategies to maintain harmony 
with others depending on the desired outcome. For example, people involved in negotiations  
may not want to praise their opponent’s logical argument if they are in disagreement so as not to 
boost the opponent’s certainty is his/her opinion (which may make the opponent resistant to 
being swayed or to compromising). Close relationship partners or individuals working closely 
together with other individuals may want to include stylistic praise to their partners when they  
are in disagreement to promote interpersonal harmony. 
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
People like to be in agreement with others. Whereas past work has demonstrated that agreement 
is important, the present work illustrates how different ways of arriving at agreement produce 
different epistemic (and, in some cases, relational) outcomes. In particular, it seems that when 
people are able to arrive at agreement in a way that heightens their experience of shared reality 
with another person, these experiences of agreement are most likely to bolster people’s certainty 
in their beliefs and reliance on the other person’s judgments. 
47  
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
AMBIGUOUS PASSAGE DESRIBING TARGET PERSON 
 
 
 
 
Michael has his own standards of behaving. As a student, he would tell on fellow classmates 
whom he saw break school rules, like cheating on tests. In fact, he claimed to his friends that 
never once in his life has he thought about cheating. [moral–self-righteous] 
Michael recently started making attempts to keep up to date with cultural knowledge. He 
read a book about Europe, sat in a music appreciation workshop, and eats in fashionable ethnic 
restaurants. When being with friends, he often talks at length about foreign cultures and art. 
[cultivated– artificial] 
Michael spends a great amount of his time in search of what he likes to call excitement. 
He has already climbed Mt. McKinley, done some skydiving, shot the Colorado rapids in a 
kayak, driven in a demolition derby, and piloted a jet-powered boat—without knowing much 
about boats. He has been injured, and even risked death, a number of times. [adventurous– 
reckless] 
Other than business engagements, Michael’s contacts with people are surprisingly 
limited. He feels he doesn’t really need to rely on anyone. [independent–aloof] 
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Once Michael makes up his mind to do something it is as good as done no matter how 
long it might take or how difficult the going might be. Only rarely does he change his mind even 
when it might be better if he did. [persistent–stubborn] 
To improve his life Michael tries to save money. He uses coupons, buys things on sale, 
and avoids donating money to charity or lending money to friends. [thrifty–stingy] 
Note. The italicized word pairs in brackets at the end of each paragraph indicate the two 
opposite trait labels that can be derived from the passage. 
49  
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 
TABLES 
 
Table 1: Number of Participants per Cell 
 
Fortuitous 
Agreement- 
Substance 
Fortuitous 
Agreement- 
Style 
Persuaded 
Agreement- 
Substance 
Persuaded 
Agreement- 
Style 
No 
Agreement- 
Substance 
No 
Agreement- 
Style 
31 31 25 23 30 26 
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Table 2: Means and Standard Errors for Perceived Responsiveness of the Partner by 
Condition 
 Mean Standard Error 
Fortuitous Agreement-Style 2.84 .17 
Fortuitous Agreement-Substance 2.88 .18 
Persuaded Agreement-Style 2.93 .19 
Persuaded Agreement-Substance 2.88 .18 
No Agreement-Style 3.02 .18 
No Agreement-Substance 2.68 .18 
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Table 3: Means and Standard Errors for Liking of the Partner by Condition 
 
 Mean Standard Error 
Fortuitous Agreement-Style 5.09 .16 
Fortuitous Agreement-Substance 5.15 .16 
Persuaded Agreement-Style 5.10 .16 
Persuaded Agreement-Substance 4.62 .17 
No Agreement-Style 5.56 .17 
No Agreement-Substance 4.68 .17 
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Table 4: Means and Standard Errors for Relational Trust by Condition 
 
 Mean Standard Error 
Fortuitous Agreement-Style 3.23 .18 
Fortuitous Agreement-Substance 3.33 .18 
Persuaded Agreement-Style 3.15 .18 
Persuaded Agreement-Substance 2.81 .18 
No Agreement-Style 3.52 .18 
No Agreement-Substance 2.81 .18 
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